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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
List of parties to the proceeding in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
for Utah County whose judgment is sought to be reviewed are Plaintiff 
Howard F. Hatch; Defendants Dwane J. Sykes; William Christiansen; E. L. 
Roy Duce, the current Trustee of the so-called "Irrevocable Trust 
Agreement," AKA "The Dwane Sykes and Patricia Sykes Children's Trust 
and/or The Dwane and Patricia Sykes Trusts." 
However, the initial proceeding in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
for Utah County filed on Nov. 30, 1995, included the following parties. 
HOWARD F. HATCH 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DWANE J. SYKES, DENNIS L. SYKES, BENOY & ANGELA 
TAMANG, Trustees of the co-called "Irrevocable Trust Agreement," AKA 
"THE DWANE SYKES AND PATRICIA SYKES CHILDREN'S TRUST 
AND/OR THE DWANE AND PATRICIA SYKES TRUST," JOHNNY M. 
IVERSON & MAX S. FERRE. 
Defendants. 
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Dennis L. Sykes, Benoy & Angela Tamang, Johnny M. Iverson and 
Max S. Ferre are no longer part of the case. They have been settled out or 
are not longer serving as in the case of named trustees. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This case was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Title 
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78, Chapter 2, Section 2 (3) (j) of the Utah Judicial Code, Utah Code, 1998. 
The case was subject to assignment to the Court of Appeals and has been 
poured-over to the Court of Appeals for disposition under 78-2a-3 (2) (j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Sykes Allowed to Slander Hatch and make Himself a Hero. 
1. A trial court judge's first obligation is to see that the 
adversary parties are treated equally, without undue preference shown to 
either party. It is his first order of business to see that an "even playing 
field" is maintained throughout the trial. (Utah Code 78-7-5, Powers of 
Every Court. General Provisions Applicable to Courts and Judges.) 
This is true in all cases, but especially critical in a trial by jury as the 
members of the jury can only view the facts in their proper light when they 
are unclouded by any kind of prejudice or bias. In this case, the 
debtor/defendant Dwane J. Sykes ("Sykes") was allowed to make manifold 
irrelevant statements as though they were statements of fact which was a 
great waste of the court's time and created confusion for the jury. 
Furthermore, Sykes was permitted to make numerous comments of a 
derogatory nature about Plaintiff/appellant Howard F. Hatch ("Hatch") in an 
effective effort to prejudice the members of the jury in his own favor and to 
8 
go on endlessly bragging about himself to bias the jury in his favor. This 
constituted a clear violations of Rules 401, 402 and 403, of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence and was an abuse of discretion on the judge's part. No party 
should be allowed to make such prejudicial, inflammatory or slanderous 
statements, about the adverse party. 
2. While it is true that whenever a witness begins to make statements 
that are irrelevant, immaterial or prejudicial, especially those which might 
bias the jury toward either party, an objection should be immediately voiced 
and such testimony interrupted. Unfortunately, Hatch's attorney failed on 
many occasions to do so out of fear of offending the trial court judge and in 
the interest of time. But objections were made by counsel and sanctions 
should have been assessed against Sykes. Even when objections were 
made, far too often, the judge let Sykes continue to ramble on with 
derogatory remarks. Regardless, the trial court judge himself has the 
primary responsibility of controlling the parties and seeing that neither party 
oversteps his bounds. From the very beginning of the trial, as noted above, 
Sykes was allowed way too much latitude both in presenting irrelevant 
material which delayed the proceedings and distracted the jury members 
from the real issues and/or made statements which had a tendency to favor 
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himself or influence the jury against the cause of Hatch. 
Even in his opening statement Sykes was permitted to create a bias in 
his favor repeatedly without interruption or sanctions being issued by the 
judge. (Please see R-2469, Trial Transcript dated October 18, 1999, pages 
3,4, 9, 10, 11,13 to 21, & 23) and in spite of plaintiff s attorney's repeated 
objections (pp. 6,13, 14, 16, 17, & 18.) 
3. Sykes was allowed to say such things asf "I am the victim myself." 
(ibid 3/16; "I tried to settle with Mr. Hatch . . . this is not about money . . . 
he (Mr. Hatch) said: 'I am going to pursue you and your family to your 
dying days.' And that is what he is doing." (ibid 9/6-13); "I guess I should 
probably add that during the last few months I have had a major stroke, and 
open-heart surgery, and major joint replacement... I had to learn to talk 
and walk again in the last few months" (ibid 10/12-16); "And the evidence 
will show that not only did he back date the date of the deed, and he lied 
about it, but then he admitted that he had lied about it and he admitted that 
he had" (ibid 17/22-25). 
4. Sykes continued the same sort of inflammable and false statements 
in his direct examination. Please see his testimony as transcribed in R-
2470, Transcript of October 19,1999, pp. 6, 8, 33 wherein he was allowed 
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to make such statements as "I am 100 percent disabled, medically disabled. 
Actually, medically, physically disabled and emotionally disabled." (ibid 
6/22-24) And in response to a question about whether he had received a 
law degree, he answered, "On the disability, I had a stroke right in the 
middle of the Duchesne thing about six years ago. It was only a mild stroke 
and a nervous breakdown. And then this year I had a traumatic stroke, 
which totally disabled me . . . " (ibid 8/3-6) (Even though this was totally 
nonresponsive to the question asked.) And then one final outrageous 
assertion: "After a 44-year relationship, because of the problems with Mr. 
Hatch, my wife divorced me." (ibid 33/7-8) 
5. This constituted clearly an abuse of discretion on the judged part 
as no party should be allowed to make such prejudicial, inflammatory or 
slanderous statements about an adverse party in a law suit. Nor should a 
party be allowed to make himself out as a hero when it is completely 
irrelevant and not supported by the facts and true evidence. See Rule 401, 
et seq., Utah Rules of Evidence. 
6. Additional supporting citations in the record. Not only was Sykes 
allowed to make wild, untrue and gratuitous accusations against Hatch in 
his opening statement and while he examined himself as a witness, he was 
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allowed to ramble on interminably during his own direct, i.e., being 
examined as his own witness by himself. In spite of Judge Burningham's 
warning to Mr. Sykes to "make just brief statements of fact . . . we can't 
have you just be narrative either. So just state pertinent facts or identify 
documents." R-2473, Trial Transcript of October 25, 1999, 5/6-10. The 
witness began immediately with a long narrative about a totally irrelevant 
matter concerning some alleged zoning violation by Mr. Hatch, having 
nothing to do with the case, the intention being clearly prejudicial. Hatch's 
attorney, Mr. Abott, interposed an objection. After allowing discussion 
between the parties for another several pages of testimony and voir dire 
examination, Judge Burningham not only allowed Mr. Sykes to continue 
testifying about such an irrelevant matter, but even granted him the liberty 
of introducing a prejudicial exhibit, No. 113, (ibid 13/7-11) being a letter 
from Orem City threatening Hatch with legal action for an alleged zoning 
violation. And in spite of the judge's warning that he was not going to allow 
Sykes to retry the case leading up to the money judgment against him, (ibid 
7/7-15) he thus opened wide the door for all kinds of irrelevant and 
prejudicial material to come in. 
7. Thereafter, Mr. Sykes was allowed to continue his narration for 
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another page and half on the same irrelevant and prejudicial matter, while 
acknowledging that it was part of the prior suit, which triggered another 
objection from Mr. Amott that was finally sustained by Judge Burningham 
(ibid 15/22-25). This did not stop Sykes, who tried to go right on with the 
same story, requiring the judge to remind Sykes the objection had been 
sustained and saying, "If you're talking about the '81 case, you need to move 
on" (ibid 16/5-6). However, the damage to Hatch's character had already 
been done. 
Undaunted, Sykes returned immediately to say, "Orem City was an 
active participant in that suit and they filed a —" which caused the judge to 
remind him to "move away from that and just get back to this lawsuit, 
okay"(ibid 17/12-13). Nevertheless, Sykes, as his own witness plunged right 
back into narrative on matters clearly out of the prior suit, "very briefly and 
quickly," as he put it (ibid 17/14), then goes for 3 and a half pages of 
testimony until finally Mr. Abott interjects an objection which the court 
sustained. But the irrepressible Sykes plunged right back on the same tack 
for another three full pages (ibid pp. 21, 22 & 23). 
8. In spite of the judge's warning that he must "Hurry right along" 
(ibid 36/11), Sykes continued his expansive narrative for another 3 pages 
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when he said he wanted to "summarize his opening statements (39/12-13). 
This gave the judge some pause, but he allowed Sykes to go on to extol the 
virtues of the children's trust, and how it had benefited them, hoping to thus 
influence the jury into not disturbing the "assets of the trust" in order that he 
might pay his own debts. 
Which brings us to the most outrageous of all of Sykes maneuvers. 
The court allowed Sykes to introduce a totally irrelevant and self-serving 
article, over Mr. Abort's strenuous objections (ibid 42/19-21), which Sykes 
claimed had appeared in the local newspaper, extolling his merits as a 
member of the "Explorers Club of New York City" (ibid pages 41 through 
43). Please see defendant's exhibit 60 in the record, entitled: "Have Guts, 
Will Travel," for the full article, but let us quote just a few sentences from 
Sykes direct testimony: "I was one of four Utah's (sic) who had been 
elected to the explorer club, that's with other people such as Neil 
Armstrong, who walked on the moon and the people who climbed Mount 
Everest, and Richard Bird, etc." (ibid 41/13-16). Sykes goes on to postulate 
that his own life was possibly the model for the movie character "Indiana 
Jones," "a boy scout from a little tiny town in Utah who is adventurous and 
goes off and does all kinds of things . . . " (ibid 42/13-14. 
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9. As Mr. Sykes continued his "direct testimony." more appropriately 
his "disparaging and prejudicial narrative," he was allowed to make a direct 
attack against Hatch in these words: "In the process of my ship sinking in 
the Uintah Basin I had a nervous breakdown. I had a stroke, a very minor 
stroke at that time. I began seeing a psychiatrist. One of my psychiatrists-
Mr. Hatch harassed both me and the psychiatrist. His name — 
attempting to cause me duress with the psychiatrist, and asking for 
information. I had a mental evaluation that said I had suffered post 
traumatic stress disorder as a result of the — my ship sinking in Duchesne . . 
. " (ibid 55/10-17). (Emphasis added.) He then proposed to "testify" 
concerning the "reputation of Howard Hatch in the community for honesty 
and veracity" (ibid 55/23-24). Of course, the plaintiffs attorney strenuously 
objected to such testimony, which the judge sustained. But this did not stop 
Sykes from proposing to offer "specific names and signatures" (ibid 56/16). 
He was only cut off when the judge said, "So don't argue with me any 
more." (ibid 56/22). 
10. From the very beginning of the trial, as noted above, Sykes was 
allowed almost unlimited latitude both in presenting irrelevant material 
which distracted the jury members from the real issues and/or statements 
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which had a tendency to favor himself or influence them against the cause 
of Hatch. 
11. The trial court abused its discretion by allowing Sykes to 
continue to slander Hatch with irrelevant, derogatory and mostly false 
charges, while making himself the victim, alleging he had suffered under 
Hatch's abusive conduct. There was "no reasonable basis for" allowing the 
diatribe of Sykes. The whole scenario was "arbitrary and capricious." See 
generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-39 and Crookston v. Fire Ins. 
Exck, 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993) and Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 
275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The standard of review is Abuse of Discretion. 
B. Inappropriate Jury Instruction # 19 
1. Over the plaintiffs very strenuous objections, the trial court 
allowed Sykes to insert a jury instruction that challenged the integrity of 
Hatch's cause and made jury members wonder just who had dirty hands and 
how to handle him. In what way, shape or form, could the issue of "unclean 
hands" come into play when the action was merely to collect an honest debt 
based on a legal judgment against Sykes? And especially one based not 
alone on a judgment in the appropriate lower court but one tested on 
appeal? (See Court of Appeals case number 960561-CA, appealing the 
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reduction of judgment in 4th District Court case No. 810457127, a copy of 
which final judgment can be found as Plaintiffs Exhibit 45 in the subject 
case on appeal.) 
We review challenges to jury instructions under a "correctness" 
standard. See Steffens en v. Smith's Mgmt Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 
1346 (Utah 1993) Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah 1998) 
2. To allow jury instruction 19 to go to the jury was a violation of 
case law on the part of the lower court. See Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 567 P. 2d 174, 176. 
The jury instruction was not "supported by the evidence." Including # 19 as 
a jury instruction created great prejudice toward Hatch and his case. 
3. (See Vonda Bassett's report numbered R-002752, pages 3 & 4 
dated October 26, 1999.) Here the judge and Mr. Sykes were considering 
the clean hands jury instruction. On page 3, lines 23-24, Mr. Sykes set 
forth his requested jury instruction, and he described it as "Two prongs of 
that: Unclean hands and he who seeks equity, must do equity." On page 3 
Sykes, at his own request, was excused and the attorneys, with the judge, 
considered the jury instructions "off the record." It was at this time the 
plaintiff (off the record) vigorously objected to and argued against including 
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jury instruction 19. 
4. The next day (October 27, 1999). on page 3 of Vonda Bassettfs 
report, the Court speaking to Sykes stated: "And Mr. Abott, I know, 
objected to your equity instruction, but I did give it. So with that, should 
we go on the record? Maybe we're on the record." R-002753 (Lines 17-
20.) (Emphasis added.) 
5. In Vonda Bassett's report for October 27. 1999 (R-002753) on 
pages 22-24 the following exchange took place: The Court: "We can 
return, Mr. Abott, to the objections you had to any of the jury instructions." 
Mr. Abott: "I think it would just be the one that was given on the equity 
instruction. My objection as I expressed it this morning — that even if this 
is considered properly a matter of equity or a case of equity, the very nature 
of the case was somewhat unique in that none of the testimony or even the 
facts precedent to what was to be received came from the plaintiff other 
than the fact that he had to have a judgment he was trying to collect, which 
is a matter of record on court. AndT therefore — and also in light of the fact 
that I had made numerous objections during the trial to evidence that 
came in regarding actions of Mr. Hatch that I felt were irrelevant to the 
issues the jury had to decide." 
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"It seems to me the equity instruction given about having clean 
hands, while certainly an axiom of the law and a truism about what equity 
is, nevertheless improperly focused the jury on issues that were not in 
evidence, that were not to be decided by them, and really were not at issue. 
And that was my objection to using it. I felt it was unnecessary and could 
cause prejudicial harm to my client. (Emphasis added.) 
6. Sykes reveals his modus operandi in the case. Following Mr. 
Abott's recognition that the jury instruction on the clean hands doctrine 
"could cause prejudicial harm to" Hatch, the court asked Sykes if he "would 
like to respond?" Sykes' response was: 
"I'd like to respond. Of course, I left this to the discretion of the 
court, other than having requested it. I'll respond in that the court could 
have very well, according to the law, and the CGS citations in my summary 
judgment motion -- the court could have instructed the jury on this that 
even if they found that all of the plaintiffs allegations were true and 
that Dwane Sykes was totally at fault, that they could still not award 
any relief to the plaintiff Hatch if they found him to have unclean 
hands." (Emphasis added.) 
In this admission by Sykes, he reveals, without apology, his whole 
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purpose (his modus operandi) in dragging Hatch through the mud and in 
giving Hatch the tar brush treatment without any justification. It also makes 
clear his reason for requesting Jury Instruction 19 on the clean hands 
doctrine. 
7. This was not a case in Equity. It was an attempt to collect a valid, 
court determined debt from Sykes. And even had it been a case in Equity, 
Hatch entered the case with clean hands and prosecuted the case with clean 
hands from the beginning to the end. Sykes "m. o." was to confuse the jury 
with slanderous statements against Hatch that had nothing to do with the 
debt collection, the case under consideration. In spite of objections by 
plaintiffs counsel and court admonishments, Sykes succeeded in clouding 
the issues with case unrelated accusations against Hatch and then succeeded 
in getting the clean hands doctrine put before the jury, in Jury Instruction 
19, on Equity and clean hands. 
8. Hatch had clean hands throughout the trial. He was simply trying 
to collect on a court ordered debt. The dirt that Sykes threw at Hatch had 
nothing to do with the trial. So even if the voiced criticisms by Sykes had 
been true, they had nothing to do with the trial as the law requires. The trial 
court should have put a muzzle on Sykes and should have forewarned the 
20 
jury. 
9. The jury instruction 19 had no place in this case and its use was 
not legally allowed and was more than a clear abuse of discretion with 
what was allowed in the record. Surely, the jury reasonedr if Hatch has 
unclean hands as Sykes has charged him with throughout the trial, then we 
certainly cannot favor Hatch with a verdict and be true to Jury Instruction 
19 that the court has charged us with. 
"In order for the doctrine of (unclean hands) to apply, the improper 
conduct must relate directly to the underlying litigation. In other 
words, the inequitable conduct must have an immediate and 
necessary relation to the claims under which relief is sought." 
Nakahara v. NS1991 American Trust, 718 A.2d, 518, 522 (Del. 
Ch. 1998). Cited by AJAYSPORTS, INC. v. CASAZZA, 1 P.3d267, 
276. Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. IV, March 16, 2000. (Emphasis 
added.) 
"The unclean hands doctrine (also known as the clean hands doctrine) 
'stands for the proposition that a litigant may be denied relief by a 
court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, 
unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful as to the 
controversy in issue.'" Gilbert v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 104 
Idaho 137, 145, 657 P.2d 1, 9 (1983) (internal quotations omitted). 
A trial court's application of the doctrine is subject to appellate 
review for abuse of discretion. (Cited in Kirkman v. Stoker, 6 P.3d 
397, 400 (Supreme Court of Idaho, July 7, 2000) (Emphasis added.) 
"In order to successfully raise the defense of'unclean hands,' the 
defendant must show: (1) that the plaintiff perpetrated some 
wrongdoing; and (2) that the wrongful act related to the action 
being litigated." Hoffman Construction Company v. U.S. 
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Fabrication & Erection, Inc. 32 P.3d 346, 360, Supreme Court 
of Alaska (2001). (Emphasis added.) 
10. Other cases, likewise, hold that any claim charging unclean 
hands to another party must show that the party acted unfairly and with 
"fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue." See Knaebel v. Heiner, 
663 P.2d 551, 554 Supreme Court of Alaska,(1983); Martin v. Allbritton, 
862 P.2d 569, 573. Court of Appeals of Oregon (1993). Hoopes v. Hoopes, 
861 P.2d 88, 92. Court of Appeals of Idaho (1993). (Emphasis added.) 
Unclean hands "argument is without merit" where plaintiff "did not 
seek equitable relief." Ayerv. General Dynamics Corporation, 
625 P.2d 913, 915. Court of Appeals of Arizona, Div. 1 (1980) 
11. With the lower court allowing a plethora of statements by Sykes 
degrading Hatch, impugning his honesty, challenging his integrity and 
simply giving him the tar brush, dirty treatment, while building himself as 
the good guy, the hero of our day, the one who has suffered endlessly over 
the years because of Hatch's dirty treatment, and then allowing the "unclean 
hands" doctrine to go to the jury for their consideration was a clear violation 
of case law as clearly pronounced by numerous courts on the subject. We 
believe this abuse of discretion in allowing false, slanderous and irrelevant 
charges into the record and the illegal use of jury instruction 19. lost the 
case for Hatch. Hatch's case was strong in his effort to collect on a court 
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order judgment, with Sykes playing loosely with properties and money in 
his efforts to conceal his assets from creditors. 
12. The trial court violated case law when it allowed jury instruction 
19 to go to the jury. The Instruction reads: "EQUITY A remedy of equity, 
and one who invokes it must have clean hands in having done equity 
himself." (R-2135). 
There was "no reasonable basis" to allow that instruction to go to the 
jury. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-39 (Utah 1994), Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exch 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). 
Giving in to Sykesf request to include the "clean hands" doctrine, with 
no justification for it, was an "arbitrary and capricious action." Kunzler v. 
O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
13. This was not a case in equity. Hatch had scrupulously clean 
hands. He was attempting to collect a court judgment against Sykes, from 
assets Sykes was doing all he could do to conceal. 
It was Sykes who wanted the "clean hands" doctrine to become part 
of the case after he had dragged Hatch's good name through the mud and 
did his best to make himself a hero. 
14. Abuse-of-Discretion Standard: The trial court abused its 
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discretion when it allowed so many irrelevant scandalous accusations by 
Sykes to be made a part of the record. "Where the trial court may exercise 
broad discretion, we presume the correctness of the court's decision absent 
'manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of . . . discretion.111 
Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d at 944. "However, f(w)hile trial courts have 
broad discretion . . . that discretion must be exercised within legal 
parameters set by appellate courts.fff Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 
472,474-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
15. By allowing Jury Instruction 19 to go to the jury, the trial court 
committed reversible error that affected substantially the rights of Hatch. 
The error was substantial and prejudicial. Counsel for plaintiff preserved 
the error as outlined above by his strenuous objections. 
Had the case been in Equity then the use of Jury instruction 19 would 
call for a discretionary ruling. But the case was not in Equity. Hatch had 
clean hands, so the standard of review is in law. There was no legal right to 
use jury instruction 19 with the clean hands doctrine. 
16. Here the question is whether the facts in this case justify the use 
of Jury instruction 19. Plaintiff claims this is a question of law allowing no 
deference to the lower court and should be determined by the appellate 
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court. This was not a case in Equity and there was no justification for the 
use of jury instruction 19. None of the other jury instructions taken 
separately or all together can overcome the damage done with jury 
instruction 19. So allowing jury instruction 19 in this case was grounds for 
reversal, even when jury instructions are considered in the aggregate. 
17. There was no plaintiff dirty hands in the case—only dirty hands 
of the defendant with his false charges and misleading statements. Use of 
jury instruction 19 confused the jury and lost the case for Hatch. When the 
judge allowed instruction # 19 to go to the jury, the jury must have felt that 
the judge felt the plaintiff had dirty hands but the jury was to make their 
own decision. For what other reason was instruction #19 sent to the jury? 
There was simply no reason at all to send jury instruction 19 to the jury. 
Sykes' "m. o." paid off, for him, and he was able to continue to 
conceal his assets and keep Hatch from collecting on the debt. 
The error of the Judge in allowing jury instruction 19 to go to the jury 
"was substantial and prejudicial." State v. Kiriluk, 975 P.2d 469, 472-473. 
UtahCtApp. 1999). 
18. At the conclusion of the jury trial, Judge Burningham 
acknowledged that Sykes wasted time and loaded the case with voluminous 
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irrelevant verbiage when he said to Sykes: 
I think that perhaps it would have been better had you had 
counsel. It would have been a four-day trial or less. It has 
taught me something. If I ever have a pro se person doing 
a jury trial again, Ifm going to start off at the very beginning 
setting some time restraints and making sure you focus on the 
relevant things. (R-002753, 25/25 and 26/1-6) (Emphasis added.) 
This case went on for seven days. If Judge Burningham's statement 
is correct about a four day trial, that means Sykes spent 3 days unloading on 
the jury with mostly irrelevant things. Unfortunately most of that 
irrelevant material was in finding fault with Mr. Hatch and making him the 
bad guy—the guy with dirty hands. Sykes succeeded with this "m. o.M when 
he got the judge to give the jury instruction # 19 on the clean hands 
doctrine. 
A clean hands jury instruction is not allowed when the plaintiff has 
not used unclean hands in the case being considered. (See cases cited 
above.) 
19. A trial court abuses its discretion when it allows defendant to 
make unclean hands charges against a plaintiff, outside of the case under 
consideration, even if the statements are true. (See cases cited above.) 
A clean hands jury instruction is not allowed when the trial is not in 
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Equity, nor when the plaintiff is not guilty of unclean hands in the trial in 
issue. The trial court committed reversible error in both counts—abuse of 
discretion and violating case law by allowing jury instruction 19 to go to the 
jury. 
We know the power to tax is the power to destroy. We might also 
say: 
The power to issue a jury instruction on the clean hands doctrine, 
when the plaintiff has clean hands, but the defendant has charged plaintiff 
repeatedly with unclean hands without legal and factual support, is the 
power to destroy the plaintiffs cause. 
None of the other jury instructions in this case, separately or taken 
together, can overcome the damage done with the use of # 19. 
C. Wrongful Summary Judgment granted Christiansen. 
1. Judge Eyre granted Christiansen summary judgment 
dismissal from the case before he had even been served and brought into 
the case. 
The interim judge who handled matters earlier in this bifurcated case, 
the Honorable Donald J. Eyre, committed a very serious error by granting 
defendant William Christensen ("Christensen") summary judgment 
dismissal without ever being served or brought into the case (R-249). 
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The Standard of Review on this issue is "a question of law, reviewable for 
correctness." See Stokes v. Van Wagoner, 987 P.2d 602, 603. (Utah 1999). 
URCP 4, Utah Code Annotated, requires personal service upon all parties to 
bring them under the court's jurisdiction as defined in Rocky Mountain 
Claim Staking v. Frandsen, 884 P.2d 1299, 1301. (Utah Ct. App. 1994), to 
wit: "Personal jurisdiction means the power to subject particular defendant 
to the decisions of court." "The requirements of Rule 4 relating to service 
of process are jurisdictional, as per Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 290. 
(Utah 1986), The court held: "There being no effective service of process, 
the court was without jurisdiction . . ." See also Martin v. Nelson, 533 P.2d 
897 (Utah 1975). 
Rule 4 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that a 
summons shall be deemed to have issued when placed in the 
hands of a qualified person for the purpose of service. 
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp, v. Dietrich, 475 P.2d 
1005, 1006. (Utah 1970) 
Service of summons in conformance with the mode prescribed 
by statute is deemed jurisdictional, for it is service of process, 
not actual knowledge of the commencement of the action, which 
confers jurisdiction.... The proper issuance and service of summons 
is the means of invoking the jurisdiction of the court and of acquiring 
jurisdiction over the defendant; these cannot be supplanted by mere 
notice by letter, telephone or any other means. Murdock v. Blake, 
484 P.2d 164, 167. (Utah 1971). 
Since Christiansen had never been served with a summons, he never 
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came under the jurisdiction of the court. Without jurisdiction, the court had 
no authority to issue a dismissal and award Christiansen attorney fees and 
sanctions. Attorney for Hatch assured the court that Christiansen was not 
served "nor was any attempt made to serve him." See Bottom of R-0247. 
But even if the court had jurisdiction, it made serious errors in handling the 
issues and those errors are reversible. See the following: 
2. In addition to the above. Judge Eyre seriously erred by 
granting Christiansen's motion to dismiss, awarding attorney fees and 
sanctions, within 11 days of it being served on the Plaintiff (actually when 
considering 3 days for mailing, it was only 8 days). 
3. Judge Eyre denied plaintiff the right to debate the issues as 
provided by Rule 4-501 (1) (B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration. 
Rule 4-501 (1) (B) of the Rules of Judicial Administration provides 
for the parties to properly debate the issues, and grants the opposing party 
10 days in which to file a memorandum in opposition, and another 5 days 
for the moving party to issue his reply memorandum. As this matter is 
based on the rules of court, it is therefore a matter oflaw and the Court of 
Appeals need not allow any particular deference to the trial court. 
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(Emphasis added.) See Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 
(Utah 1989); as cited in American Vending Services, Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 
917, 919-920. (Utah App. 1994). 
Furthermore, "When we review a judgment entered on a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 (b) (6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
'we are obliged to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor.' " Heiner v. S. 
J. Groves & Sons Co. 790 P.2d 107, 109. (Utah Ct App 1990). 
And as Judge Eyre did not make reference to any of the Plaintiffs 
arguments whatsoever in his order (R-2201) or consider the plaintiffs offer 
to voluntarily dismiss Christensen, nor wait to hear the various contentions, 
it is obvious he did not do this. 
The Honorable Donald J. Eyre has clearly abused the rules and the 
discretion granted lower courts when he refused to hear the Plaintiffs 
motion for reconsideration, characterized as a "Reply to Christiansen" (R-
0249) or properly consider his response to the motion to dismiss by a 
named, but as yet un-served defendant, Christiansen. This, even in the face 
of Plaintiff s offer of voluntary dismissal. Rather, the judge went on to 
award attorney's fees against the plaintiff and to impose sanctions under 
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Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allowing a jury to determine the 
extent of damages due to Christiansen on his counterclaim. The Standard of 
Review in this instance comes under the "clearly erroneous" category, the 
"correction of error" and determination of an "abuse of discretion" 
standard. See Barnard v. Sutliff 846 P.2d 1229, 1233-1235. (Utah 1992). 
"Plaintiffs Response Reply to Christiansen's Motion to Dismiss And 
Counterclaim; And Plaintiffs Motion For Dismissal and/or Removal of 
Christiansen as a Named Party Defendant," (R-0249) makes it clear Hatch 
did not accept Christiansen as a defendant under the jurisdiction of the court 
nor did he consider the court's rulings on the Christiansen's matter, that 
came later, proper and binding, but subject to review. The court completely 
disregarded the arguments of Attorney Amott and later issued its rulings 
granting attorney fees and sanctions. Those rulings, Hatch has appealed. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC 
The United States Constitution, Article II, Section 2 (1) states that 
"The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity. . . " The 
Utah Judicial Code, Section 78-7-5 states regarding the "Power of every 
court," (9) "to amend and control its process and orders to conform to law 
and justice." Rule 8 (f) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code 
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Annotated, says: "Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so 
construed as to do substantial justice." Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, provides as follows: "(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a 
reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) 
has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, 
impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that 
have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation, (c) (1) 
How initiated, (c) (1) (A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule 
shall be made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe 
the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as 
provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court 
unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period 
as the court may prescribe), the challenge paper, claim, defense, 
contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately 
correct. If warranted the court may award to the party prevailing on the 
motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees..." Rule 401, et seq., Utah 
Rules of Evidence (as attached in the Addendum). Rule 5 Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, "Instructions to jury; objections." (as Attached in the 
Addendum) (Emphasis added.) 
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A STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND ATTENDANT FACTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE: It was to have been a simple collection action. 
BACKGROUND: Based on events that transpired in the mid 1970s, Hatch 
obtained a judgment against Sykes, his wife Patricia and his brother, Dennis 
Sykes, for slander of title and a number of other allegations. A jury 
awarded Hatch a judgment for damages in the amount of $509,942 (R-665). 
The defendants succeeded in getting this reduced to $141,694 based on a 
trial court ordered "amended judgment" (R-662). But on appeal, this court 
(Case No. 960561 CA), remanded the case to the trial court with 
instructions to restore much of the money judgment award, resulting in a 
final judgment of some $260,000 (Plaintiffs exhibit No. 45, p. 8). 
Immediately after the original jury verdict, Sykes' brother, Dennis 
Sykes, who had been a co-defendant in the action, deeded off to "Benoy and 
Angela Tamang, Trustees" property which he had been holding for what 
appeared to be Dwane and Patricia Sykes, the other two defendants, (R-667 
and plaintiffs exhibit No. 33). Plaintiff Hatch, acknowledging that the 
defendants, Dennis and Patricia Sykes, had only played minor roles in the 
events giving rise to the judgment, agreed to settle with them for a fraction 
of the judgment amount, intending to settle the matter of the remaining sum 
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due directly with the defendant Dwane Sykes. 
Attempts to execute on property at the Sykes1 estate proved fruitless 
as everything of any real value was claimed by Dwane Sykes as exempt 
from execution or to have been given to other family members. With the 
bulk of the Sykes' assets having been transferred to other entities, it was 
necessary for Hatch to initiate this action in an attempt to collect the sums 
due. In the initial framing of the complaint, filed November 30, 1995 (R-
20), it was based on allegations of fraudulent conveyances to defeat 
creditors. But as additional discovery was had, there appeared to be 
evidence that the Sykes had some years earlier created at least one trust that 
had the appearance of being "irrevocable." It therefore became necessary to 
amend the complaint to include not only the allegations of fraudulent 
conveyances but also charging that Sykes had been using the vehicle for his 
own personal benefit to defeat creditors, that what was alleged to be 
"irrevocable" might more truly be construed as "self-settled trusts," 
revocable, or living trusts, where he himself was the de facto trustee and the 
principal beneficiary. 
The court was consequently asked to set aside the conveyances to the 
trust and make these assets available for execution in satisfaction of the 
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debts of Sykes, as his interest might truly appear (See Second Amended 
Complaint Including Petition for Determination of Validity and Assets of 
Trust, (R-688). 
At trial, evidence was presented to show that the Sykes, for a number 
of years, had a personal line of credit at Far West Bank out of which large 
sums of money had been spent (Transcript of proceedings, 10/20/99, 28/19-
25 & 29/1). When the sums had built up to some $135,000 (ibid 33/8) 
without serious attempts to retire the debt, the bank demanded satisfaction 
(Iverson Deposition, op cit.,83/3-7). See also Iverson's testimony at trial, 
(R-002747, page 43, lines 17-25). The matter was settled by liquidating a 
"trust" asset, the Lynnwood Park property rental house. (Transcript of 
proceedings, 10/20/99, 39/14-16). It was also shown that Dwane and 
Patricia Sykes, the "trustors" of the "Sykes Family Trust" had been the 
beneficiaries of a very valuable 7-acre estate where they lived, for the 
nominal amount of $5 01 per month rent. (Transcript, 10/19/99,134/2-6). 
That Dwane Sykes had run the affairs of the trust single-handedly for many 
years, was clear from the testimony of the so-called "trustees." For 
instance, Johnny Iverson admitted he had never received a copy of the 
original trust agreement, even though he had requested to a have a copy 
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many times. (See Iverson Deposition in Probate Case. No. 943400122, 
dated 9/19/94, published by permission of the Trial Court and filed in this 
case with the Court of Appeals on February 19,2002, p. 91, lines 22-25, 
also 92/1-17); nor a schedule of properties belonging to the trust, (ibid 
39/19,20) because Dwane Sykes was holding them" (ibid 39/9). He also 
admitted he had never received a copy of the trust's "schedule of assets," 
(ibid 39/23, 24); or any of the files relating to business of the trust; (ibid 
40/7-8) or that he ever paid the real property taxes on trust properties (ibid 
40/24-25) or ever filed any tax returns for the subject trusts (ibid 44/14-15). 
In fact he said it was Dwane Sykes who prepared the tax returns for the trust 
(ibid 44/12-13). It was also Dwane Sykes who balanced the checkbook, 
according to his trustee, Johnny Iverson (ibid 34/11-13). 
In at least one instance, this same trustee acknowledged having 
signed 50 checks in blank on the trust account so that Dwane Sykes could 
use these funds for whatever purpose he chose without recourse to the 
nominal trustee, his brother-in-law (ibid 35/1, 6 & 7, 8, 9 & 10, 24 & 25). 
See also Transcript of proceedings in this case, 10/19/99, pages 65 & 69 ~ 
65/8-12 and 69/17-20). Johnny Iverson gave Dwane Sykes notice he was 
withdrawing as trustee in the early 1980s (ibid 54/7), that while he did act 
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as trustee in the purchase of a rental house in Orem for the trust in 1986, 
(referred to by Johnny Iverson as the "Palisades house," otherwise known as 
the "Lynnwood property"), he considered himself relieved of those duties as 
of that year (ibid 48/5-6) until he considered it necessary to sign a formal 
withdrawal, (ibid 47/12-13). He gave as his reason for withdrawing 
as trustee lack of time personally and also that "I suspected that there were 
things going on in the trust that I didn't know about." (ibid 54/2-3) For one 
thing he discovered that properties had been put in his own personal name 
which should have been put into the trust (ibid 51/22 & 53/19-23). Not 
being satisfied that Dwane Sykes had terminated his duties as trustee or 
made provisions to indemnify him personally or reimburse him for his 
expenses, he sued the trusts. (See Probate matter 943400122, in the Fourth 
District Court, Utah County, Utah). He had previously made it clear he 
would not be the custodian of the books or trust agreement papers and had 
demanded he be released from further obligations. He had therefore found 
it necessary to bring suit against Sykes and the trust to be released of his 
responsibilities as "trustee." 
In handling the listing and/or sale of numerous of so-called trust 
properties, it was Dwane and/or Patricia Sykes who signed documents 
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offering them for sale and signing closing documents. (See Plaintiffs 
exhibit No. 1 where Patricia and Dwane Sykes1 signatures are to be found as 
the "sellers" of the Lynnwood Park property at 949 E. 1120 South, Orem, 
Utah, a property affirmed by the Sykes as having been in the trust from its 
acquisition to the final sale). In a number of instances, "trustees" claimed 
no knowledge about the affairs of the trust, saying they did not know that 
various of the trust properties were even in the corpus of the trust. 
In another instance, one involving Dwane Sykes' brother, Dennis Sykes, he 
had been formally called to serve as trustee for a time but resigned that post 
shortly thereafter, only to have property remain in his name which was 
supposed to be "trust property." But as soon as judgment was had against 
him, as well as Dwane and Patricia, for the torts against Hatch, and he 
found that a number of properties remained in his name which should have 
been "trust property," he immediately quit claimed all interest in these real 
properties (Plaintiffs exhibit No. 33). At trial, Dwane Sykesf explanation 
for this discrepancy was that title had remained in Dennis1 name during all 
those years acting as a "nominee" for the trusts. 
Disposition in the Court Below: — the Case in Chief: 
Either the jury failed completely to identify the actions of fraud and 
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self-serving actions of the defendant Dwane Sykes, as were evident in the 
case, or they had been so prejudiced against the plaintiff Hatch, or biased in 
favor of Sykes, that their verdict reflected no cause of action against any of 
the properties said to have been fraudulently conveyed (R-2219-20). 
Disposition of the Rule 11 Sanctions: 
Judge Eyre, having allowed for the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions 
against Hatch, a bifurcated jury trial was held in July of 1999, the outcome 
of which was that the jury awarded a judgment of $1,000 against Hatch 
under Christiansen's counterclaim for damages (R-2193). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant brings 5 separate issues before the court for review. 
However, these can be grouped into 2 different segments. All 5 issues have 
to do with what we perceive as either a strong prejudice against Hatch 
and/or his attorney or a gross misunderstanding of his duties as judge and 
arbiter. 
The first two issues involve Judge Burninghamfs direction of the 
proceedings at the jury trial held in October of 1999. 
1. Issue one concerns the lax way in which the judge conducted 
the trial, allowing a tremendous amount of irrelevant and immaterial 
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testimony to come before the jury. This would not have been so damaging 
to Hatch's cause had not virtually all of it been introduced in an effort to 
either prejudice the jury against the cause of Hatch or to create a bias in 
favor of Sykes. Allowing so much irrelevant material in also worked 
against Hatch's interest in another way. It not only created confusion in the 
minds of the jurors by obscuring the real issues in the case but also used up 
much of the time needed by Hatch to make a very difficult case, i.e., to 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the so-called trust property 
was being treated as private property by Sykes, and that virtually all of the 
transfers which had been made into the trust had been to defeat creditors. 
Because of the difficulty of this task, Hatch's attorney was very sensitive to 
the time constraints. He rightly perceived that part of the defense's strategy 
was to burn up the time by endless objections put forth frivolously by the 
attorney representing the Sykes' trusts and by Sykes, who was allowed to 
represent his own interests pro se, bringing before the jury nothing but 
irrelevant and scandalous assertions designed to confuse and prejudice the 
jury. And because Hatch's attorney was so sensitive to the shortness of 
time, he did not always object as strenuously to these proceedings as he 
should have, either in an effort to conserve the time allotted or out of fear of 
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offending the trial judge. 
2. The second issue for review has to do with this same spirit of 
prejudice created in the minds of the jury at the October trial before Judge 
Burningham. This time it was in allowing a jury instruction to be included 
entitled, "Equity/1 which suggested that Hatch had come before the jury 
with "unclean hands." In retrospect, one must wonder if the judge, having 
allowed Sykes to make so many irrelevant and slanderous assertions, as 
though they were statements of fact, was not prejudiced himself to such an 
extent that he would allow such a jury instruction to be considered. How 
could such an instruction not prejudice the jury even more against the cause 
of Hatch. 
3. The final three issues to be reviewed all stemmed from the 
actions of Judge Eyre during the preliminary proceedings in November of 
1997. The Defendant Christiansen's attorney submitted a motion to dismiss 
his client even before he was served. Judge Eyre not only (a) allowed him 
to be dismissed without considering any of the arguments put forth by the 
attorney for Hatch as to why he had been named as one of the proposed 
defendants but also (b) granted attorney's fees and (c) sanctions against 
Hatch in a decision issued within 11 days of the motion being filed. As the 
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details in our "Argument" will show, this not only violated at least 3 
separate rules of the court but manifested a very serious prejudice against 
Hatch and/or his attorney by refusing to look at any of the arguments put 
forth at the time or review his decision subsequently. This one ruling 
subjected Hatch to the payment of attorney's fees, sanctions and a damage 
award at the end of a jury trial held in July of 1999. It also created a 
prejudice that may well have carried throughout the proceedings and 
affected the final outcome before Judge Bumingham at the jury trial held in 
October of that year. 
Our cause before the jury was sabotaged by Sykes, aided and abetted 
by the attorney representing the trusts being attacked, when the trial judge, 
Judge Bumingham, allowed a tremendous amount of immaterial, irrelevant 
and scandalous material to be brought before the jury in the face of much 
hard evidence that the so-called "irrevocable trusts" were used to defeat 
creditors by allowing the so-called "trustors," Dwane and Patricia Sykes, his 
wife, to treat the property of the trust like a self-settled, or revocable living 
trust. Had the trial been handled in a fair manner, and according to the 
proper rules of evidence, it is our belief that Hatch would have prevailed at 
trial and been allowed to execute against the assets of the so-called trusts. 
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Hatch was unfairly subjected to penalties by Judge Eyre in his 
premature decision to dismiss Christiansen and issue various sanctions, 
including those under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. And 
that Hatch should have been allowed to proceed against land being held in 
Christiansen's name for the benefit of Sykes. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Burningham abused his discretion when he continued to allow 
scandalous, irrelevant accusations made by Sykes against Hatch to become 
part of the record. These continuous efforts made by Sykes to drag Hatch 
through the mud, to dirty his name, took place throughout the trial to make 
Hatch a target when Sykes later proposed Jury Instruction #19, which 
Judge Burningham mistakenly approved. 
When the Judge approved jury instruction # 19 in this case he went 
beyond what the law allows. There was nothing in this case that would 
allow the use of the clean hands doctrine. The plaintiff had clean hands and 
this case was not in Equity. 
"When it comes to reviewing trial court determinations of law, 
however, the standard of review is not phrased as "clearly erroneous." 
Rather, appellate review of a trial court's determination of the law is usually 
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characterized by the term "correctness." Controlling Utah case law teaches 
that "correctness" means the appellate court decides the matter for itself and 
does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law." State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
Judge Eyre failed to follow the law when he dismissed Christiansen 
from the early part of the bifurcated case and granted attorney fees and 
sanctions to Christiansen. Appellate court decides the matter for itself and 
does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of the law. 
Plaintiff Hatch requests the Court of Appeals to reverse the holdings 
of the lower court in both parts of the bifurcated case and remand the case 
back to the Fourth Judicial District court for a new and fair trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of August, 2004. 
Spencer F. Hatch 
Attorney for Appellant, 
Howard F. Hatch 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Jury Instruction 19 
B. Jury Instruction 1 to 38 
C. Rule 5, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Service of Pleadings) 
D. Rules 401 to 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (Relevancy) 
JURY INSTRUCTION / ? 
EQUITY 
A remedy of equity, and one who invokes it must have clean hands in having done equity 
limself. 
A 
r\ A r\ *~ 
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FILED ^ 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
JURY INSTRUCTION / Fj^^M^putv 
INTRODUCTION 
Members of the jury, I would like to thank you for your attention 
during this trial. I will now explain to you the rules of law that you 
must follow and apply in deciding this case. When I have finished you 
will go to the jury room and begin your discussions, what we call your 
deliberations. Please pay attention to the legal instructions I am about 
to give you. This is an extremely important part of this trial. 
You are not to single out one instruction alone as stating the law, 
but must consider the instructions as a whole. The order in which the 
instructions are given has no significance as to their relative 
importance. If a direction or an idea is stated more than once, or in 
varying ways, no emphasis is intended and none must be inferred by you. 
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NATURE OF CASE 
Instruction No. 
The party who brings a lawsuit is called the plaintiff In this action the plaintiff is 
Howard F. Hatch. The party against whom the suit is brought is called the defendant. In this 
action the defendants are Dwane Sykes and three irrevocable trusts he and his former wife 
established. Mr. Hatch is represented by Ralph C. Amott, Attorney. Dwane Sykes represents 
himself. The Trusts are represented by B. Kent Ludlow, Attorney. 
The Plaintiff brought this action seeking the right to pursue assets of Defendant Sykes 
which he and his former wife, Patricia had previously placed in the ownership of three separate 
Trusts they set up for the benefit of their children. The language of the trusts make the various 
Sykes children the beneficiaries of the trusts and state that the trusts are irrevocable. Plaintiff 
seeks the right to go after these assets to satisfy a judgment obtained in February of 1995 against 
Defendant Dwane Sykes in the amount of approximately $225,000.00. 
Plaintiff brings this action based on two theories of law under the Fraudulent Transfer 
Act. Plaintiff argues that many of the conveyances made from Mr. Sykes to the trusts, to 
nominees or trustees or by others controlled by Mr. Sykes should be labeled fraudulent 
conveyances done with the intent to defraud or delay lawful creditors of Mr. Sykes. Plaintiff 
further argues that Mr. Sykes' improper influence or control of trustees, nominees and trust 
assets, are factors, among others, which show he actually intended to hinder, delay or defraud 
lawful creditors of Mr. Sykes. If Plaintiff is successful, he would be able to set aside the 
conveyances made to the trusts. 
1*~ * 
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Defendant Dwane Sykes and the Defendant Trusts through their attorney, deny any 
impropriety in the operation of the trusts alleging, among other things, that all actions taken by 
the trusts and their trustees over the years, have been solely for the benefit of the children and not 
for any other persons. That the trustees, nominees or others were not controlled by Mr. Sykes 
and none of the conveyances made by Mr. Sykes or others, should be labeled fraudulent 
conveyances done with intent to defraud or delay lawful creditors of Mr. Sykes. Defendants 
further argue that Dwane Sykes did not improperly control or influence trustees, nominees or 
trust assets to hinder, delay or defraud lawful creditors or Mr. Sykes. If Defendants are 
successful Plaintiff would not be able to set aside the conveyances made to the Trusts. 
JURY INSTRUCTION ^ 
DUTY OF THE COURT 
It is my duty to instruct you in the law that applies to this case, 
and it is your duty, as jurors, to follow the law as I state it to You, 
regardless of what you personally believe the law is or ought to be. 
Even if you do not like the laws that must be applied, you must use 
them. On the other hand, it is your exclusive duty to determine the 
facts in this case, and to consider and weigh the evidence for that 
purpose. Your responsibility must be exercised with sincere judgment, 
sound discretion and honest deliberation. 
JURY INSTRUCTION ~ 
SYMPATHY, PREJUDICE, PASSION 
This case must not be decided for or against anyone because you 
feel sorry for anyone or angry at anyone. It is your sworn duty to 
decide this case based on the facts and the law, without regard to 
sympathy, passion or prejudice. 
JURY INSTRUCTION Q 
CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE 
This case must be decided only upon the evidence which you have 
heard from the witnesses, and have seen in the form of documents, 
photographs or other tangible things admitted into evidence. 
Anything you may have seen or heard from any other source may not 
be considered by you in arriving at your verdict. 
You should not consider as evidence any statement of the lawyers 
made during trial. 
<V 
JURY INSTRUCTION & 
DUTY OF LAWYERS 
Remember, the lawyers are not on trial. Your feelings about them 
should not influence your decision in this case. The lawyers are here 
to represent the best interests of their clients. It is the duty of the 
lawyer on each side of a case to object when the other side offers 
evidence which the lawyer believes is not admissible. You should not 
speculate as to the reasons for the objections, nor should you allow 
yourself to become angry at a party because a party's lawyer has made 
objections. 
JURY INSTRUCTION / 
PROVINCE OF JURY 
It has never been my intention to give any hint that you should 
return one verdict or another in this case. Please understand that I do 
not wish in any way to influence your verdict. It would be improper for 
me to do so. Deciding a proper verdict is exclusively your job. I 
cannot participate in that decision in any way. Please disregard 
anything that I may have said or done if it made you think that I 
preferred one verdict over another, that I believed one witness over 
another, or that I considered any piece of evidence more important than 
another. 
You are the exclusive judges of the facts and the evidence. It is 
your duty to render a just verdict based upon the facts and the 
evidence. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION CJ 
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses 
md the weight of the evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony 
md credibility of the witnesses, you have a right to take into 
:onsideration any biases, any interest in the result, and any motive or 
ack of motive to testify fairly. You may consider the witnesses' 
:onduct while testifying before you, the reasonableness of their 
statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want of it, their 
opportunity to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to 
emember. You should consider those matters you believe have a bearing 
m the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses' statements. 
JURY INSTRUCTION / 
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
You may believe that a witness, on some former occasion, made 
statements inconsistent with that witnessfs testimony given here in this 
case. 
That does not necessarily mean that you are required to entirely 
disregard the present testimony. The effect of such evidence upon the 
credibility of the witness is for you to determine. 
r*i .t 
JURY INSTRUCTION /O 
EFFECT OF WILLFULLY FALSE TESTIMONY 
If you believe any witness has willfully testified falsely as to 
any material matter, you may disregard the entire testimony of that 
witness, except as that witness may have been corroborated by other 
credible evidence. 
JURY INSTRUCTION // 
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY 
In the present action, certain testimony has been read to you by 
way of deposition. You are not to discount this testimony for the sole 
reason that it comes to you in the form of a deposition. It is entitled 
to the same consideration as if the witness had personally appeared. 
JURY INSTRUCTION 
STATEMENT OF OPINION 
An opinion is the expression of a conclusion or judgment which does 
not purport to be based on actual knowledge. In determining whether a 
particular statement was a statement of fact or merely an expression of 
opinion, you may consider the surrounding circumstances under which it 
was made, the manner in which the statement was made and the ordinary 
effect of the words used. You may also consider the relationship of the 
parties and the subject matter with which the statement was concerned. 
JURY INSTRUCTION /S 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
Whenever in these instructions it is stated that the burden of 
proof rests upon a certain party, or that a party must prove a certain 
proposition, or that you must find a certain proposition to be true, I 
mean that unless the truth of the allegation is proved by clear and 
convincing evidence, you shall find that the same is not true. The 
Burden of Proof in this case rests upon the Plaintiff. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION tiL 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
A fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial 
evidence consists of facts or circumstances that give rise to a 
reasonable inference of the truth of the facts sought to be proved. 
JURY INSTRUCTION /^ 
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE 
Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that produces in your 
mind a firm belief as to the matter at issue. This involves a greater 
degree of persuasion than is necessary to meet the preponderance of the 
evidence standard; however, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not 
required* 
For evidence to be clear and convincing, it must at least have 
reached the point where there remains no substantial doubt as to the 
truth or correctness of the conclusion based upon the evidence. 
JURY INSTRUCTION /& 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
The term "preponderance of the evidence" means that evidence which, 
in your minds, seems to be of the greater weight; the most convincing 
and satisfactory. The preponderance of the evidence is not determined 
by the number of witnesses, nor the amount of the testimony, but by the 
convincing character of the testimony, weighed impartially, fairly and 
honestly by you. If the evidence is evenly balanced as to its 
convincing force on any allegation, you must find that such allegation 
has not been proved. 
INSTRUCTION NO. / 7 
In all criminal cases, the State is required to prove each element of the crime charged 
against a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden of proof is required to be based 
only on the legal evidence presented in court. You must keep in mind in assessing whether the 
State has met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the burden never shifts to a 
defendant to call any witnesses, produce any evidence or disprove any element of the crime 
charged. 
In the context of the above, you are instructed that a reasonable doubt is a doubt based 
on reason and common sense growing out of the evidence or lack of evidence in this case. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute certainty but requires 
that degree of proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of those who are 
bound to act conscientiously upon it. 
If, after an impartial consideration of all of the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt 
as to a defendant's guilt, you must acquit that defendant. If, however, after such consideration 
of the evidence you have no reasonable doubt, you should find such defendant guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. tf 
The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of mind and connotes a purpose in 
so acting. Intent being a state of mind is seldom susceptible of proof by direct and positive 
evidence and must ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statements and circumstances. 
Thus, you would be justified in inferring that a person must have intended the natural and 
probable consequences of any act purposely done by that person. 
JURY INSTRUCTION / ? 
EQUITY 
A remedy of equity, and one who invokes it must have clean hands in having done equity 
himself. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 7-0 
HOLDING TITLE TO PROPERTY IN NOMINEE NAME 
Utah law governing the powers of Trustees specifically provides that Trustees have the 
power to hold property in the name of a nominee or other form without disclosure of the trust. 
Further, the trusts themselves authorize the Trustee to hold title to property in nominee name. 
JURY INSTRUCTION 2f 
TAKING OF NOTES 
I have noticed that some of you have been taking notes during the 
testimony. The use of notes in the jury room to refresh your memory is 
perfectly acceptable. But let me caution you not to rely excessively 
upon your notes. You must arrive at a verdict independently, after 
consultation with the other jurors; and each of you must rely on your 
own memory of the evidence. One juror's opinion should not be given 
excessive consideration solely because that juror has taken notes. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
ALL PARTIES EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW 
The fact that the plaintiff is an individual and some of the defendants are trusts, should 
make no difference whatever to you. It is your duty to hear and determine this case the same as if 
it were between individuals. You should look solely to the evidence for the facts and to the 
instructions I give you for the law, and return a true and just verdict according to the facts 
established by the evidence and the law as I have stated it to you. 
JURY INSTRUCTION 2ff 
MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS 
Although there are multiple defendants in this action, it does not 
follow from that fact alone that if one is liable, all are liable. Each 
defendant is entitled to a fair consideration of that defendant's own 
defense, and is not to be prejudiced by the fact, if it should become a 
fact, that you find against another defendant. Unless otherwise stated, 
all instructions given you govern the case as to each defendant. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. Z ^ A 
I ' l ' i i i K J i i l e i i l l i i i i i i is lhi A i I til I, In mil 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred I a iehtn is fraudulent as to a creditor, 
v whether the creditor's claim arose before or atter the iiansfsr was made or the obligation 
was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: 
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; 01 
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or 
obligation; and the debtor: 
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business on: a ti ansaction for 
which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in 
relation to the business or transaction; or 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believe 
he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due 
(2) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (l)(a), consideration may be given, 
among other factors, to whether: 
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider, 
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of tin1 properly 11 suisfoi r*m*l \\\\< i (lit. 
transfer; 
(c) the transfer' or obligation was disclosed or < onc«-ai« 
(d) before the transfer was made .*• ^ligation \ as --H. « I ed, the debtoi had been 
sued or threatened with suit; 
(e) the transfer was of substai t • -r V!-* 
(f) the debtor absconded; 
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent 
to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; 
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was 
made or the obligation was incurred; 
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a si lbstantial debt was 
incurred; and 
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the busin -
transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor. 
JURY INSTRUCTION Z *•/ 
ATTITUDE AND CONDUCT OF JURORS 
Your attitude and conduct at the outset of your deliberations is 
very important. It will not be productive for any of you, upon entering 
the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of your opinion on the 
case, or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. 
When that happens, your sense of pride may be aroused and you may 
hesitate to recede from an announced position, even if shown that it is 
wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in this matter, 
but are judges. Your deliberations in the jury room are for the 
ascertainment and declaration of the truth and the administration of 
justice. 
JURY INSTRUCTION 25-
JURORS TO PELIBERATE AND AGREE IF POSSIBLE 
1 ; is your • :.',, ,i:. . •<; > 
deliberate w: : : i . *i - • reaching .in agreement, II your I ndi v i nua . 
judgment ! !-\. . * •••iroemont •* s <- - \h ^u?,j d*-1 - i ^  the case for 
youi i d ,
 t ^ ' . , : i r-s : ( i 
jurors •w should • hesitate i<- vUaugf an opinion when convi :ic -I 
thau JLL ±s wiuny. i!••v::^**-- "hould surrende* your hon^*31 
convictions concerning u. . *• . •. • m I he intpa i • 
purpose of returning a verdict or solely because of the opinion >r ?h 
Ohor irors. 
JURY INSTRUCTION 2(3' 
RESORT TO CHANCE 
The law forbids you to decide any issue in this case by resorting 
to chance. 
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AGREEMENT r, .N.R;R.( MJ, SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 
It is \\.-*\ d-»" f "» irnV- 'indinns of h r ^ as to *•!* 
subi . .1 id: . - yoi l : ;. , i -J l** 
that uc kuiden - 1 jioviruj any disputed fact rests upon < :\o : 
rlainiir.g the fact _ L^ true, and that fact must be pr r-* 
:< 
»»uc . ^  a ciii: action and six members ol tho iur may : 11 
'eturn a verdict - I*MSI -* * V 'nir^is miirf aqreo . i. '! r. • .. 
[ues" i • i :t.- . • qutsticn . 
s S I A .^i i.iuLr ol y-.Mi ijave agreed -.-i* he answei t< each questio. 
he verdict signed and dated ^ ^uai foreperson i \ • -
h 
JURY INSTRUCTION C-Q 
SELECTION OF FOREPERSON AND RETURN OF VERDICT 
Upon retiring to the jury room you will select one of you to act as 
foreperson, who will preside over your deliberations and sign the 
verdict to which you agree. The foreperson should not dominate the 
jury, but the foreperson's opinion should be given the same weight as 
the opinions of the other members of the jury. 
1 n I JTAi I RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 5 
in the hands of a qualified pei sen i foi sen \ ice 
until seven months after the complaint was 
filed, the summons was not timely issued. 
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, ,25 
Utah 2d 65, 475 P.2d 1005 (1970), 
Amended complaint . 
In wrongful death action filed November 15, 
1973 with no summons issued, filing of 
amended complaint on November 8, 1974 did 
not recommence action, but amended corn 
plaint related back to time of original one by 
virtue of Rule 15(c); therefore, since summons 
did not issue within three months of filing of 
complaint, action was dismissed. Cook v. 
Starkey, 548 P.2d 1268 (Utah. 1976). 
- W a i \ CM :, 
If a party appears in court, counterclaims, 
and is partially successful, the party may not 
claim untimely service under Subdivision (b). 
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 18 Utah 2d 102, 417 P.2d 
118(1966), 
C i ted in State ex rel "I Jtah State Dep' t of 
Social Servs. v. Santiago, 590 R2d 335 (I Ji ah 
1979); Wood v Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053 (Utah 
1987); Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 R2d 111 
(Utah Ct. App, 1987); Schultz v. Conger, 755 
P.2d 165 (Utah 1988); Wilcox v. Geneva Rock 
Corp., 911 R2d 367 (Utah 1996); DOIT, Inc. v. 
Touche, Ross & Co., 926 R2d 835 (Utah 1996); 
Cooke v. Cooke, 20011 JT App 1 10, 22 R3d 1.249. 
COT ; I \AWF? A I U F F K K RNCKS 
Utah L a w Review. — */MWI««-
Utah's Notice Requirements for * * » * 
Actions, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 657. 
Recent Developments in Utah I .*v 
cial Decisions — Constitution:!* ? 
Utah L. Rev. 153. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law Judi 
cial Decisions — Civil Procedure, 1989 I Jtal m I ., 
Rev. 166. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for In 
Personam Default Judgement in Utah: Gra-
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations 
§ 2192 et seq.; 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Cor-
porations, Counties and Other Political Subdi-
visions, § 854; 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process § 1 et 
seq.; 72 Am. Jur. 2d States, Territories, and 
Dependencies § 126. 
• C.J.S. — 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1305 et 
seq.; 20 C.J.S. Counties § 263; 64A C.J.S. Mu-
nicipal Corporations § 1956 et seq.; 72 C.J.S. 
Process § 26 et seq.; 79 C.J.S. Schools and 
School Districts § 436; 81 C.J.S. States § 226. 
A.L.R. — Mistake or error in middle initial 
or middle name of party as vitiating or invali-
dating civil process, summons, or the like, 6 
A.L.R.3d 1179. 
Attorney representing foreign corporation in 
litigation as its agent for service of process in 
unconnected actions or proceedings, 9 A.L.R.3d 
738. 
Civil liability of one making false or fraudu-
lent return of process, 31 A.L.R.3d 1393. 
Construction of phrase "usual place of 
abode," or similar terms referring to abode, 
residence, or domicil, as used in s tatutes relat-
ing to service of process, 32 A.L.R.3d 112. 
Airplane or other aircraft as "motor, vehicle" 
like within s ta tute providing for con-
•»-1 or substituted service of process on 
nonresident motorist, 36 A.L.R.3d 1387 
Sunday or holiday, validity of service of si iini 
mons or complaint on, 63 A.L.R.3d 423. 
In personam jurisdiction under long-arm 
statute of nonresident banking institution, 9 
A L.R.4th 661. 
I n pe rsona m o i te i i i tor i a I j u i isd ic t i oi i of 
state court in connection with obscenity prose-
....i:.,., -f author, actor, photographer, publisher, 
>r, or other party whose acts were 
the state, 16A.L.R.4th 1318. 
- * srisdiction over nonresident 
defendant in at sed on obscene or threat-
ening telephoi from out of state, 37 
A.L.R.4th 852. 
Necessity and permissibility of raising claim 
for abuse of process by reply or counterclaim in 
same proceeding in which abuse occurred -
state cases, 82 A.L.R.4th 1115. 
Service of process by mail in international 
civil action as permissible under Hague Con-
vention, 112 A.L.R. Fed,. 241 
R u l e 5* S e n i o r a ml filiiifj ill pit iiiliiif s iiiiiinl (illllii i p a p e r s . 
(a) Service: When required, 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by 
the court, every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, every 
pleading subsequent to the original complaint, every paper relating to discov-
ery, every written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and 
every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and similar 
paper shall be served upon each of the parties. 
(2) No service need be made on parties in default for failure to appear except 
as provided in Rule 55(a)(2) (default proceedings). Pleadings asserting new or 
additional claims for relief against a party in default shall be served in tin1" 
manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4, 
(3) In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through MITPHI, 
Rule 5 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 18 
named as defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an 
answer, claim or appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or 
possession of the property at the time of its seizure. 
(b) Service: How made and by whom. 
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made 
upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made upon the 
attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. Service upon the 
attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing a 
copy to the last known address or, if no address is known, by leaving it with the 
clerk of the court. 
(A) Delivery of a copy within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney or 
to the party; or leaving it at the person's office with a clerk or person in charge 
thereof; or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place 
therein; or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving 
it at the person's dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of 
suitable age and discretion then residing therein or, if consented to in writing 
by the person to be served, delivering a copy by electronic or other means. 
(B) Service by mail is complete upon mailing. If the paper served is notice of 
a hearing and if the hearing is scheduled 5 days or less from the date of service, 
service shall be by delivery or other method of actual notice. Service by 
electronic means is complete on transmission if transmission is completed 
during normal business hours at the place receiving the service; otherwise, 
service is complete on the next business day. 
(2) Unless otherwise directed by the court: 
(A) an order signed by the court and required by its terms to be served or a 
judgment signed by the court shall be served by the party preparing it; 
(B) every other pleading or paper required by this rule to be served shall be 
served by the party preparing it; and 
(C) an order or judgment prepared by the court shall be served by the court. 
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there is an 
unusually large number of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own 
initiative, may order that service of the pleadings of the defendants and replies 
thereto need not be made as between the defendants and that any cross-claim, 
counterclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense 
contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other parties 
and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon the plaintiff 
constitutes due notice of it to the parties. A copy of every such order shall be 
served upon the parties in such manner and form as the court directs. 
(d) Filing. Except where rules of judicial administration prohibit the filing 
of discovery requests and responses, all papers after the complaint required to 
be served upon a party shall be filed with the court either before or within a 
reasonable time after service. The papers shall be accompanied by a certificate 
of service showing the date and manner of service completed by the person 
effecting service. 
(e) Filing with the court defined. The filing of pleadings and other papers 
with the court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with the 
clerk of the court, except that the judge may accept the papers, note thereon 
the filing date and forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk. 
(Amended effective September 4, 1985; January 1, 1987; November 1, 1997; 
April 1, 1999; April 1, 2001.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 5(d) is specific use in the case. The committee is of the 
amended to give the trial court the option, view that a local rule of the district courts on 
either on an ad hoc basis or by local rule, of the subject should be encouraged, 
ordering that discovery papers, depositions, The 1999 amendment to subdivision (bXIXB) 
written interrogatories, document requests, re- does not authorize the court to conduct a hear-
Quests for admission, and answers and re- ing with less than 5 days notice, but rather 
647 1 JTAI f 'TT'LFlSOFFVIDFNrF Rule 401 
A l t ! 1UJLE 1V. ItU JLE \n V 
AND ITS LTMIT« 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidenced 
"Relevant evidence" moans evulrntv having an> tendency to make the 
existence of any fact thai is of 'consequence to the* determination of the action 
more probable or less prcL.jfh th-u. -I In- wiOwnit the evidence. 
i-..r> Committee* Note. This rule i- disprove the existence of any "materia] fact." 
stibatins and i.s comparable m Avoiding the use of the term "material fact" 
*le 1<2). Utah Rules of Evidentt accords with the application given to former 
t iy i , .: iiiv fonnei rule defined relevant Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court. State v. 
evidence as that having a tendency to prove or Peterson, 560 R2d 1387 (Utah 1977). 
1 10 FES ' rO DECISIONS 
Burden of proof, 
Discovery. 
Effect of remoteness. 
Relationship to crime charged. 
Victim's testimony on defense theory. 
Cited. 
Bu r a -
te. 
»> two p a n Inunda t ion of ic le-
vut v t d r n n * r U i e wi tness ' s hea l th 
his tory, ofi* ^e of a t t a c k i n g t h e 
witness's CP .,, e he did not show 
that the witness's mental health disorder im-
paired the witness's ability to accurately per-
ceive, recall, and relate events, nor did defen-
dant offer evidence that the disability was 
contemporaneous with the witness's observa-
tions or testimony. State v, Stewart, 925 P.2d 
598 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
In a prosecution for raj>e, it was not error to 
exclude testimony of defendants expert on Jap-
anese cultural values since its only relevance 
was to the credibility of the victim, not any 
elements of the crime, and defendant did not 
lay a proper foundation for its admission. State 
v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Discovery. 
Defendant's stipulation that she would not 
use a vehicle valuation comparison at trial 
removed any need plaintiff might have had for 
information useful to impeach that document. 
The information sought was therefore irrele-
vant and undiscoverable. Majoi v., I I ills, 1999 
UT 44, 980 P.2d 683. 
Effect of r e m o t e n e s s , 
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the 
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v i 
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst,, 605 P.2d 314 
(Utah 1979), overruled on 'h<r ground-; 
McFarlancl v. 
(Utah 1984). 
Skaggs Cos., Ii ic., 678 P.2d 298 
R e l a t i o n s h i p to ci ime c h a r g e d . 
Evidence of nicknames, chants, and dances 
by defendant and his friends, which was not 
remote in either time or place and provided 
background for the rape charged, was admissi-
ble. State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, 25 P.3d 985. 
Victim's t e s t imony oi i de fense theory . 
In a prosecution for attempted aggravated 
murder arising from an incident in which the 
defendant, while a passenger in an automobile, 
thrust a gun at a police officer after the vehicle 
was stopped for a traffic violation, the court 
properly excluded testimony as to whether the 
officer had ever heard of people pulling guns on 
police officers in an at tempt to commit suicide, 
as any such knowledge by the police officer was 
not relevant to the defendant's state of mind at 
the time of the incident and as the defendant 
was allowed to present his theory of "officer 
assisted suicide" by other means. State v 
Colwell, 2000 UT 8,994 P.2d 177. 
Ci ted in State v. Gray, 717 R2d 1313 (Utah 
1986); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123 (Utah 
1986); Meyers v. Salt Lake City Corp., 747 P.2d 
1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Fisher ex rel. Fisher 
v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988); State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 
(IJtah 1988); State v. Maurer, 770 R2d 981 
(Utah 1989); State, In re R.D.S., 777 P.2d 532 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) Whitehead v. American 
Motors Sales Corp., 801 R2d 920 (Utah 1990); 
State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991); State v. Larson, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992); State v. 633 E. 640 N., 942 P.2d 925 
(Utah 1997); State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 
UT 59. 6 P.3d 1120. 
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Rule 402 UTAH HULKS OF EVIDENCE 6 4 8 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrele-
vant evidence inadmissible. 
AH relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Advisory Commit tee Note . — The text of 
this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence (1974) except tha t prior to the word 
"statute" the words "Constitution of the United 
States" have been added. 
C o m p i l e r ' s Notes . - The Utah rule also 
adds the words "or the Constitution or the state 
or Utah'' to Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence (1974). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Discretion of court. 
Effect of remoteness. 
Harmless error. 
Irrelevant evidence. 
Other crimes. 
Probability evidence. 
Relevance. 
Scientific evidence. 
Standard of review. 
Cited. 
Discret ion of court. 
The trial court is given considerable discre-
tion in deciding whether or not evidence sub-
mitted is relevant. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 
P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). 
While relevant evidence is generally admis-
sible, a trial court has broad discretion to de-
termine whether proffered evidence is relevant, 
and the appellate court will find error in a 
relevancy ruling only if the trial court has 
abused its discretion. State v. Harrison, 805 
P.2d 769 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 
327 (Utah 1991). 
In a personal injury action, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence 
of plaintiff's prior injuries because they were 
relevant to the issues of causation and dam-
ages. Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Prods., Inc., 939 
P.2d 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Effect of remoteness . 
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the 
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v. 
Zions Coop. Mercantile I n s t , 605 R2d 314 
(Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, 
McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 
(Utah 1984). 
Harmless error. 
Even if the admission of testimony regarding 
the ammunition and firing s ta tus of firearms 
used in the commission of a crime was errone-
ous, t ha t error was harmless where the defen-
dant objected only to the first a t tempt to admit 
the evidence and failed to raise an objection to 
the admission of the testimony from later wit-
nesses, since the evidence would have been 
before the jury and the reviewing court could 
not say there was a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result. State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 
35, 999 P.2d 7. 
Irr«*li»v»nt ev idence . 
participant in the crime had no bearing on 
defendants guilt or innocence and was properly 
excluded as not relevant to defendant's partic-
ipation in the crime. State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 
586 (Utah 1983). 
Other crimes. 
In deciding whether evidence of other crimes 
is admissible under Rule 404(b), the trial court 
must determine (1) whether such evidence is 
being offered for a proper, noncharacter pur-
pose under that rule, (2) whether such evidence 
meets the requirements of Rule 402, and (3) 
whether it meets the requirements of Rule 403. 
State v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, 993 P.2d 837, 
cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1164, 120 S. Ct. 1181, 145 
L. Ed. 2d 1088(2000). 
P r o b a b i l i t y ev idence . 
Courts have routinely excluded probability 
evidence when the evidence invites the jury to 
focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical 
conclusion rather than to analyze the evidence 
before it and decide where truth lies. State v. 
Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986). 
Relevance . 
In an action arising from a motor vehicle 
accident in which the sole issue was the extent 
of damages, evidence that the defendant was 
not injured in the accident was relevant as an 
indicator of the severity of the accident. 
Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc., 1999 UT 
109, 992 P.2d 969. 
Defendant's statements to one individual 
that he would be better off killing his wife than 
divorcing her, to his girlfriend that his wife was 
going to have an "accident." and to another 
individual asking him to kill his wife were 
relevant as they tended to demonstrate defen-
dant had a plan, intent, and motive to kill his 
wife. State v. Mead. 2001 UT 58. 27 P.3d 1115. 
Scient i f ic ev idence . 
The Fryc test (that scientific tests still in the 
experimental stages should not be admitted in 
evidence, but that scientific testimony deduced 
from a well recognized scientific principle or 
discovery is admissible if the scientific principle 
is sufficiently established) is a valid test, 
though not necessarily an exclusive test, for 
determining when scientific evidence is suffi-
'* -
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sislent with Rules 402,. 41 »3, and 702 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. Kofford v. Flora, 744 
P2d 13 Kill Hah 19871. 
S t a n d a r d of review. 
The judgment of the t ria 1 con i t ad in 111 i rig' oi 
excluding evidence will not be reversed unless 
it is shown that the discretion exercised therein 
h a s be e 11 a b u s e d. Ti ; r i "> v. Z i < > n s C o< J p, I\ 1 <; * re a i i 
• ri( \*\h> * ^u o i ' } it r u m i : ? / 9 ) , o v e r r u l e d 
on other grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., 
• n i ujh ; » ' > ( | * O M i i * •• 1<1M i * 
Ci t ed in State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992); Salt Lake City v. Alires, 2000 
UT App 244, 9 P.3d 769; Campbell v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 IIT 89, 432 
I Hah Adv. Rep. 44, - P.3d —. 
I ' ' i ! LATERAL REFERENCES 
*tn i-aw Review. • - Li nifeti Statva 
>ung'. Novel Scientific Evidence and tb 
iiun ofFrve, 1986 Utah L. Rev, 839 
.„e, Establishing Paternity Through -*- • 
'lasting: Utah Standards for Admissibility, IW* 
Utah L. Rev. 717. 
The Mysterious Creation of Search and Sei 
f
" • • • Exc 1 usionary Rules Under State ("Ionstitu-
»: The Utah Example, 1993 IHah I,. Rev. 
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.. 1996" I J tah L. Rev. 1131 . 
I - Admissibility of voice stress evalu. 
uL.«i. test results or of statements made di iring 
test, 47 A.L.R.4th 1202. 
Admissibility and weight of evidence of prim 
inisidentification of accused in connection with 
commission of crime similar to th; it pr< ?s< » n t b ' 
charged, 50 A.L.R.4th 1049. 
Products liability: admissibility of evidence of 
absence of other accidents, 51 A.L.R.4th 1186 
Tli e i"" in (>gra p 11 ic t < >s I s: a d ni i i ; s i I)"!""" 
s in person •' • • \ ^im-
<' 111 n i n a 1 law: d og s ce n t d i s c ri m i n a t i o n 1 i i i e 
i>s.. 63 A.L.R.4th 143. 
Products liability: admissibility of exp< •• 
mental or test evidence to dispp"-" <!**("> 
motor vehicle, 64 A.L.R.4th 125. 
Admissibility, in criminal cases, of evidence 
of electrophoresis of dried evidentiary 
bloodstains, 66 A.L.R.4th 588. 
Admissibility, in prosecution for sex-re la ted 
offense, of results of tests on semen, or seminal 
fluids, 75A.L.R.4th 897. 
Admissibility of hypnotically refreshed or eii 
tianced testimony, 77 A.L.R.4th 927. 
Admissibility of DNA identification evidence, 
8 1 A.L.R.4th 313. 
Admissibility in evid< nice of composite pic-
ture or sketch produced by police to identify 
offender, 23 A.L.R.Sth 672. 
Admissibility of results of presumptive tests 
indicating presence of blood on object, 82 
A L.R.fHh 67. 
Rule 403. Exclusion
 c. . .uvant evidei IC e • • ci i it g i ci i m ds ID f 
prejudice, confusion, «>«* waste of time. 
Although i eievant, evidence may be excluded if its probative va.u* ,3 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of ci imulative evidence. 
Advisory C o m m i t t e e Note . — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantia i ly 
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as 
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The 
change in language is not one of substance, 
since "surprise" would be within the concept of 
"unfair prejudice** as contained in Rule 403. See 
also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 
403 indicating that a continuance in most in-
stances would be a more appropriate method of 
dealing with "surprise/ ' See also Smith v. 
Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1977) 
(surprise use of psychiatric testimony in capital 
case ruled prejudicial and violation of due pro-
cess). See the following Utah cases to the same 
efleet. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 
P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 
1260 (Utah 1.980); Reiser v I-nhnn - H P2d 9* 
(Utah 1982). 
Cross -Refe rences . — Admissibi.'.u «--t ^ 
dence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a). 
Balancing' t,< ;st. 
Bias. 
Blood-soaked clothii ig. 
Childhood sexual experience,'s. 
Circumstantial evidence. 
Confusion of issues. 
Credibility of witness. 
Cumulative evidence 
Determination o f a ci i I i i s s i 1: :;> 11 i t. _ 
n ; „i,.;i,; i M.. .... 
Expert, testimony. 
Extent of damages. 
Film of murder scene. 
Guilty plea. 
Harmful error. 
Harmless error 
Impeachment of witness. 
Inflammatory evidence. 
Offensive remarks. 
